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Abstract A cooperative game-theoretic framework is introduced to study
the behavior of cooperating and competing electrical-energy providers in the
wholesale market considering price-preference rational consumers. We study
the physical and economic aspects of the power transmission system operation
focussing on the incentives for group formation. We analyze the interactions
of generators in an idealized environment described by a DC load flow model
where the network is lossless and is operated by an independent network op-
erator who ensures network stability and fulfillment of consumption needs
while taking into account the preferences of consumers over generators. We
show that cooperation of generators may be necessary to divert consumers
from their previous providers. In the second part of the paper we assume an
iterative process in which the generators publish their price offers simultane-
ously, based on which the consumers preferences are determined. We study
the dynamics of the prices and profits as the system evolves in time while each
coalition is trying to maximize its expected profit in each step. The model
deals with network congestion and n − 1 line-contingency reliability as not
every generator-consumer matching is allowed to ensure the safe operation of
the transmission system. The profit of the generators is determined as the dif-
This work was supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under its Momentum
Programme (LP-004/2010), by the Hungarian National Fund (OTKA NF-104706) and by
the Fund KAP-1.2-14/001.
Da´vid Csercsik
Pa´zma´ny Pe´ter Catholic University, Pra´ter U. 50/A 1083 Budapest, Hungary
Tel.: +36-1 886 47 00
Fax: +36-1 886 47 24
Game Theory Research Group
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budao¨rsi
U. 45, 1112 Budapest, Hungary
Tel.: +36-1 309 26 52
Fax: +36-1 319 31 36
E-mail: csercsik@itk.ppke.hu
2 Da´vid Csercsik
ference between their income and their production cost, which is a quadratic
concave function of the production amount.
Any non-monopolistic proper subset of the generators may cooperate and
harmonize their offered prices to increase their resulting profit. Since we al-
low the redistribution of profits among cooperating generators, a transferable-
utility game-theoretic framework is used. Furthermore, as cooperation affects
the outsiders as well, the resulting game is defined in partition function form.
The model is able to demonstrate some interesting benefits of cooperation as
well as the effect of market regulations and asymmetric information on the
resulting profits and total social cost.
Keywords Networks · Power Transmission · Game theory · Externalities
1 Introduction
Because of its extreme importance, power system economics (Kirschen and
Strbac, 2004) has been an intensively researched interdisciplinary area. The
trends of electricity market liberalization, together with occasionally rapidly
extending consumption in the long term and consumption peaks in the short
term, put increasing load on system operators and authorities responsible for
network operation and expansion.
If one wishes to analyze the electrical-energy market as interactions of
market participants, one has to take into account that the possible interactions
are constrained by laws of physics as well as by market regulations.
Studies approaching the topic from the engineering discipline dominantly
consider optimal power flow (Wood andWollenberg, 2012; Conejo and Aguado,
1998) and direct current optimal power flow (DCOPF) problems. In these
approaches the aim is to minimize the total cost of system operation under
various constraints. These papers, among others, study how the topology of
the network affects transmission efficiency and thus how the usage of flexible ac
transmission systems (FACTS) (Hingorani, 1993; Hingorani et al, 2000; Song
and Johns, 1999) may be optimized. Unit commitment (Sheble and Fahd,
1994) addresses the problem of economically optimizing generator schedules
over a short-term horizon subject to demand and other constraints. The unit-
commitment problem has been approached by various optimization methods
(see e.g. (Cheng et al, 2000; Zhuang and Galiana, 1990)), and reformulated to
include transmission constraints (Tseng et al, 1999).
Regarding safety issues of power system operation, optimal transmission-
switching models (Fisher et al, 2008; Hedman et al, 2008; ONeill et al, 2010),
which formulate the optimization as a mixed-integer problem, usually assume
n−1 contingency reliability (Hedman et al, 2009), which means that the effects
of single line and generator failures on the network are included in the analysis.
The latest models of Hedman et al (2010) even include generator startup and
shutdown costs as well.
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While the above papers provide valuable insight in the problems of optimal
network design and operation, they do not assume profit-oriented generators
and neglect several economical incentives of the market participants.
When studying the economic aspects of electric-power transmission net-
works, most of the research has focussed on the topics of competition, market
power and regulation (Gilbert et al, 2004; Neuhoff et al, 2005; Chen et al,
2006). A large-scale spatial optimization model of the European market con-
sidering nodal or zonal pricing is presented in (Leuthold et al, 2012). The
proposed model is used for the prediction of optimal congestion management,
expansion planning and generator investments under network constraints. A
generalized Nash equilibrium model of market coupling in the European mar-
ket is presented in (Oggioni et al, 2012). The Cournot assumption has been
used in several papers (Cardell et al, 1997; Yao et al, 2004; Sauma and Oren,
2007) to analyze the market power in electrical energy trade models. The pa-
per (Metzler et al, 2003) focuses on the effects of arbitrage in a Nash-Cournot
equilibrium model. A further example of Nash-Cournot equilibrium models
applied to power markets may be found in the paper (Gabriel et al, 2013)
The paper of Ruiz et al (2012) assumes profit maximizing providers, network
constraints and uses an equilibrium framework to predict prices and profits in
a pool-based electricity market. Pool-based markets are detailed furthermore
in (De la Torre et al, 2003, 2004) These and similar models (Bakirtzis et al,
2007) usually assume elastic demand and piecewise constant price-demand
curves and market clearing, and lead to MPECs (mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints) or EPECs (equilibrium problems with equilibrium
constraints) (Ehrenmann, 2004).
The articles (Hobbs and Kelly, 1992; Bai et al, 1997) already use game
theory for transmission analysis. Hobbs and Kelly (1992) use static cooperative
models to calculate the possible outcomes of short-run transmission games
and noncooperative Stackelberg games to model long-run games in which the
amount of transmission capacity is a decision variable. The paper by Bai et al
(1997) describes an open-access transmission method for maximizing profits
in a power system, where transmission losses are considered. The proposed
method is based on the Nash bargaining game for power-flow analysis in which
each transaction and its optimal price is determined to optimize the interests
of individual parties.
The paper of Orths et al (2001) describes a game-theoretic approach of a
multi-criteria optimization problem related to transmission planning and op-
eration. A strategic-gaming approach is described in (Kleindorfer et al, 2001).
The paper of Harrington et al (2005) describes a collusive framework motivated
by power-generation auctions in which players coordinate in order for each to
gain higher payoffs than those determined by the Nash equilibrium solution.
This model has been extended by Liu and Hobbs (2013) to take transmission
constraints into account as well.
Gately (1974) was probably the first to apply cooperative game theory to
planning investments of electrical-power systems. In this paper the concepts
of the core and the Shapley value are used to determine the mutually accept-
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able set of final payments. The paper (Evans et al, 2003) describes a cost
assignment model for electrical transmission system expansion is using kernel
theory. The study by Sauma and Oren (2007) addresses network expansion as
well and shows that in the presence of imperfect markets the elimination of
network congestion may not necessarily improve social welfare. The methods
of cooperative game theory have been applied for the analysis of the trans-
mission expansion problem both in the case of centralized and decentralized
environment (Contreras, 1997; Contreras and Wu, 1999, 2000; Contreras et al,
2009).
Corresponding to the pricing problem of electricity markets, Bolle (1992)
compares constant and spot prices in oligopolistic models, using supply func-
tions. Fuller (2005) analyzes the relationship between the hourly spot price at a
node, and the prices at all nodes adjacent to it. Considering market regulations,
Singh et al (1998) compare a nodal pricing framework with cost-allocation
procedures in the case of competitive electricity markets, and analyze some
game-theoretic aspects of the proposed model. The paper of Ding and Fuller
(2005) considers nodal, zonal and uniform marginal prices and emphasizes that
the nodal marginal price correctly accounts for transmission constraints and
losses in some cases.
As pointed out by Liu and Hobbs (2013) transmission constraints can be ex-
ploited by strategic firms to enhance their market power, and collusive genera-
tors can strategically exploit transmission congestion and reap additional prof-
its compared to the situation without congestion. Our aim in this paper is to
introduce a transferable-utility game-theoretic model (Arnold and Schwalbe,
2002), which is able to describe the various levels of generator firms’ cooper-
ation, while taking into account profit-motivated generators, various market
regulations and engineering type modelling assumptions of the transmission
system as well (n− 1 line contingency reliability). It is natural to assume that
under certain market regulations, coalition formation of generators may be
illegal; however coalitions may be interpreted also as generators belonging to
the same energy-providing company.
The proposed market model is liberalized in the sense that consumers, who
are characterized by zero elasticity demand, may choose their preference over
power providers who compete for them based on their price; but each consumer
is be assigned to only one provider at a time. We assume that the formation
of coalitions who could raise their prices as high as they wish is prohibited.
To analyze how the prices and profits evolve in time, we study an iterative
process in which the generators publish their price offers simultaneously in each
step, based on which the consumers preferences are determined. Each coalition
tries to optimize its expected profit in each step, based on the price offers of the
previous step. Our aim in this paper is not to study the equilibrium properties
of the proposed framework, but to get an impression of how the dynamics of
prices and profits are affected by coalition formation in various cases.
A further aim is to analyze the effect of market regulations (allowance
or prohibition of zonal pricing) and asymmetric information on the resulting
profits of the generators and on the total social cost (the total amount of
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money the consumers pay to the generators in order to supply their needs).
The approach of cooperative game theory has the capability to describe various
levels of cooperation between oligopolistic and, in this case, two coalition-
competitive scenarios. In transferable-utility cooperative games the concept
of superadditivity is used for the description of whether a coalitional merger
brings benefits to the merging coalitions, and whether this benefit depends
on the behavior of other players (not involved in the merger) or not. A such
analysis may provide a valuable tool for the identification of incentives for
cooperation - in other words it may predict which generators may be motivated
for cartel formation.
2 Materials and Methods
2.1 Game-theoretic preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players, and its non-empty subsets are
the coalitions, denoted by C. A partition P is a set of disjoint coalitions; P =
{C1, C2, . . . , Cm}, where their union isN , i.e., players in setK cooperate if and
only if K ∈ P . The set of partitions is P and the set of partitions of C ⊆ N
is P(C). A partition function; V : P → (2N → R) assigns a characteristic
function (v) to each partition. A characteristic function v : 2N → R assigns
to each coalition C ⊆ N its worth or payoff v(C), with the convention that
v(∅) = 0. A cooperative game with transferable utility in partition function
form, or briefly PFF-game (Thrall and Lucas, 1963), is a pair (N, V ), where
the worth of a coalition may be different in each partition.
Externalities describe the effect of the formation of a coalition on third
parties (e.g. if A and B forms a coalition, they affect the payoff of C as well).
Externalities may be positive if the payoff of a third-party coalition increases
when a particular coalition forms or negative if the payoff decreases.
2.2 Modelling assumptions
We consider a model of the electricity market and the underlying energy-
transmission network. For the description of the underlying network we will
use the DC load flow model and the corresponding terminology defined in
(Csercsik and Ko´czy, 2011)1. The DC load flow model has been widely used
1 The most important feature of a DC load flow model is that if we make some key
assumptions regarding the power grid (neglect the real part of line impedance, and assume
the same peak voltage at every node) then the mathematical form of the equations describing
the real power flow will be equivalent to the equations describing the flow of the DC current in
a resistance network. The admittance values (Y ) and the injected/consumed energy amounts
of the nodes uniquely determine the energy flows on the edges (branches or lines) of the
network, which can be obtained by the solution of a system of linear equations. In addition to
its admittance value, each edge is characterized by a transfer capacity (q), which corresponds
to the maximal amount of energy which can be transferred on it. Furthermore, as a most
simple approach we neglect transmission losses.
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among papers analyzing power-system economics (see e.g. (Tseng et al, 1999;
Yao et al, 2004; Sauma and Oren, 2007)).
The DC load flow model is based on the graph of the transmission net-
work. For the sake of simplicity we will assume that every node of the energy-
transmission network is assigned to a single generator or consumer. The most
straightforward interpretation of the model is that we study the high-voltage
energy-transportation networks, in which case consumers correspond to local
energy providers who own mid-voltage networks.
In the following we summarize the assumptions regarding our model
– We assume ng generators, which are considered as the players of the game,
nc consumers and nl lines.
– Any consumer is allowed to buy energy from only one generator.
– As the focus of this study is to analyze the competition and cooperation
of energy providers under various market regulations (prohibition or al-
lowance of zonal pricing), we neglect the demand elasticity of consumers
(it is supposed that consumers buy their total required amount of energy,
even if not on the most preferred price), and assume perfectly predictable
loads. This might be a relevant assumption if we consider that the con-
sumers are local-area suppliers who have to fulfill residential consumer
demands and can not propagate the production-cost changes in the short
term (eg. they have long-term contracts with the residential consumers and
buy energy with-short term contracts. For more on demand elasticity in
energy markets see (Bernstein et al, 2006; Berndt and Wood, 1975)).
– Depending on the actual market regulation, each generator may offer nodal
(consumer-dependent) or universal prices (same for all consumer), which
determine the priority of consumers over the generators.
– Each generator has limited production capacity, which may limit the num-
ber of consumers it can supply with energy.
– Generators act as the players of the game, while rational price-priority
consumers are assumed.
– Generator j offers energy for sale to consumer k at price pojk. If no zonal
pricing is allowed pojk = po
j ∀ k. We summarize the offers in the price-offer
matrix PO, where [PO]k,j = po
j
k.
Considering the prices offered by the generators, the consumers (who are
assumed to be price-preference rational2) set up preferences describing from
which generator they want to purchase their required amount of energy.
The preference of each consumer can be regarded as an ordering of the
generators. Since the prices offered by the providers may be the same, the
preference ranking is not necessary strictly monotonic.
Based on these preferences and network characteristics, the independent
system operator (ISO) determines a matching µ of generators and con-
2 Which means they set up preferences based only upon the price offers. They prefer the
generator most who offers them energy at the lowest price, the second most preferred is the
one offering the second lowest price, etc.
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sumers. A matching µ is a set of generator-consumer pairs, in which every
consumer is included in one and only one pair.
Definition 1 We call a matching µ between generators and consumers fea-
sible is every generator’s capacity allows it to fulfill of all those consumers’s
requirements who are assigned to it.
Definition 2 We call a matching µ stable if the resulting network config-
uration implies a stable state of the network. A stable state of the network
is when no line is overloaded, and no instantaneous failure of any line may
lead to overload of any other line in the network (n-1 line contingency in
other words).
First the ISO identifies if the most preferred matching (the matching which
implies the lowest resulting total cost for the consumers) is feasible and sta-
ble. In case it is, it will be the resulting matching. If the most preferred
matching is not stable or not feasible, the ISO analyzes all matchings where
the preferences are violated in one case (one consumer is assigned to its sec-
ond most preferred generator), and from the stable and feasible matchings
it chooses the one which brings the least additional cost to the consumer
who is subject of preference violation (who is not assigned to its most
preferred generator). If multiple matchings exist in which the additional
cost is nearly equal, the one with higher stability margin will be realized.
The stability margin for a matching µ may be defined as follows. If the
matching is unstable, the stability margin is 0. If the matching is stable,
the value of the stability margin S can be defined as
S(µ) =
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
qj − q
i
j
where qij is the flow on line j in the case of the failure of line i, and qj is
the maximal allowed flow on line j.
If no such matching exists, the additional costs of the matchings with two
preference violations will be analyzed, etc. If there is at least one feasible
and stable configuration, the algorithm will stop.3
This matching will determine the resulting prices. pjk denotes the price
which is paid by consumer k to generator j for one unit of energy. pjk=po
j
k
for all {k, j} pairs in the matching.
3 A possible alternative for this matching method is when the ISO calculates all possible
matchings, and chooses that stable and feasible one, which implies the lowest total cost for
the consumers. As the number of all possible matchings grows exponentially with the number
of generators and consumers, this would significantly increase the computational demand of
the algorithm (see the details in Fig. 1). The application of the preference-violation based
iterative search, which provides the social optimum (the lowest total social cost) in most
cases, may be regarded as a trade-off, which significantly lowers the computing capacity
needed for the ISO and thus enhances scalability, but theoretically may lead to suboptimal
solutions.
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In other words, the ISO ensures the fulfillment of the matching most pre-
ferred by the consumers under the constraints implied by the network sta-
bility and feasibility requirements. The parameters of this configuration
depend on the actual prices offered by the generators.
– The generators are fully aware of the ISO’s matching algorithm.
– The concept of plant utilization is important when analysing the costs of
generating electricity. It can be observed that a plant with low utilization
inevitably has a high unit cost of production because the same investment
and fixed costs of operation and maintenance are recovered over fewer units
of production. As the most simple approach, we assume that generation
cost per unit is linear decreasing function of generated quantity4: cj =
aj −mjQj where aj [$] and mj > 0 [$/MWh] are the constants describing
the production characteristics of generator j (which depend on the applied
technology), while Qj [MWh] is the total energy quantity produced by the
generator. The total generation cost of a generator can be formulated as:
Cj = cjQj
– The income of a certain generator is the sum of the incomes from various
consumers:
Ij =
∑
k∈Sj
pjkQk
where Sj is the set of consumers who buy energy from generator j. Qk
[MWh] denotes the quantity bought by consumer k.
– Profit of player j denoted by Φj [$] can be calculated as the difference of
income and generation cost for the player: Φj(PO) = Ij(PO)−Cj(Qj). In
the case of full or pure competition (all singleton coalitions) it is assumed
that all players try to maximize their own expected profit5.
– One straightforward interpretation of coalitions is to assume that the gen-
erators of a certain coalition belong to the same company (we would like
to emphasize that still in this case we assume that consumers buy energy
from generators, not from the coalitions). The worth or payoff of a given
coalition embedded in a partition is determined as follows: Coalitions de-
termine their price offers jointly to maximize their expected overall (total)
profit. A basic assumption of transferable-utility coalitional game theory
applies here: we assume that the members of a coalition may freely redis-
tribute their profits among themselves. We have to note that if we consider
a different interpretation of coalition formation, and assume that differ-
ent generators belong to different but cooperating companies, this is not
necessary true in a realistic economic environment.
Based on the price offers the ISO determines the matching. The value of a
coalition embedded in the partition P is defined by the sum of the profits
4 Although it is possible that near the production capacity limits the validity of the
decreasing marginal cost assumption is questionable, to keep the model as simple as possible,
we restrict our analysis to the case where the linearly decreasing marginal cost assumption
is valid. The model can be easily extended with more complex production characteristics.
5 The expected profit is the profit value which would be realized if all players outside the
coalition would offer the same prices as in the previous step.
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corresponding to its members:
V (C,P ) =
∑
j∈C
Φj
Since we allow the redistribution of profits among cooperating generators,
and cooperation may affect agents not included in the coalition (exter-
nalities), the resulting game is defined in partition function form (Thrall
and Lucas, 1963). Briefly, this means that the value of a certain coalition
does depend on the partition in which it is embedded (in other words, the
coalition structure of other players).
– The following market regulations are assumed:
– We assume that anti-cartel regulations exclude the formation of mo-
nopolistic coalitions.
Definition 3 We call a coalition monopolistic, if the presence of at
least one member of the coalition is unavoidable in any matching which
is stable and feasible.
Example Let us consider a 3 generator (nodes 1,2,3) 2 consumer (nodes
4,5) network. We summarize a matching with a two row matrix, in
which a consumer (in the first row) is matched with the generator (in
the second row) of the corresponding column. Eg. the matrix
(
4 5
1 1
)
means that both the consumers 4 and 5 are assigned to generator 1.
Let us furthermore assume that only the matchings
(
4 5
1 1
)
,
(
4 5
2 2
)
,(
4 5
1 2
)
,
(
4 5
1 3
)
and
(
4 5
2 3
)
are stable (in the sense of definition 2) and
feasible (in the sense of definition 1). In this case none of the singleton
coalitions or the coalitions {1, 3} or {2, 3} are monopolistic while the
coalition {1, 2} is, because generator 1 or 2 appears in each possible
(stable and feasible) matching.
The exclusion of monopolistic coalitions will result in the fact that de-
spite any allowed cooperation, there will be at least two alternatives
(considering coalitions) for any consumer, which implies a true com-
petition. In other words we limit the validity of the model to those
scenarios where the consumers have real alternatives It is reasonable
to assume that if a monopolistic scenario arises, and the monopoly be-
gins to vindicate its market power, the consumers will react with the
decrease of the demand. Since as it has been discussed, our model as-
sumes zero demand elasticity, and does not intend to analyze these
cases.
– We assume zonal or general pricing. In the former case the generators
may offer different prices for different consumers, while in the letter case
every generator has to define one uniform price valid for all consumers.
– In the scenarios of symmetric information we assume that non-cooperating
players have no information about each other’s production characteristics
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(a and m) but they are fully aware of the consumers’ preference-setting
principles, all offered prices in the previous step, and the ISO’s matching
algorithm. Asymmetric information assumptions are detailed in Section
3.3.
– Regarding the iterative simulation of the model, generators are assumed
to give price offers in each step, based on which consumers determine their
preference over the generators. Based on these preferences the ISO deter-
mines a (stable and feasible) matching between consumers and generators
and the corresponding transactions will be completed according to this
matching.
– The generators publish their price offers simultaneously.
2.3 Model formulation
In this subsection, based on the assumptions enumerated in Section 2.2, we
summarize the model parameters, elements, and variables. We assume that
the coalitions are priori defined, fixed for the entire time of the simulations,
and we analyze only partitions which do not include monopolistic coalitions.
Model Parameters:
– The (N,E) graph of the network, including the admittance and maximal
transmission capacity of the lines E, and the partitioning of the node set
N into generator and consumer nodes.
– The production characteristics of the generators (aj > 0 and mj > 0 for
generator j).
– The desired consumption values of the consumer nodes, and the generation
capacities of the generator nodes.
Furthermore, the pricing algorithm of each coalition (AC) may vary. In
game-theoretic terms, the players of the game are the generators and their
strategy space is the set of prices offered for the consumers in each step.
2.3.1 Consecutive offers and the PFF game of generators over the network
We simulate the model in discrete time, where the time steps are denoted by
the integer t. Since the offered prices (which are the model variables) change
from time-step to time-step we introduce the argument t as pojk(t). This implies
that PO is also a function of time, denoted by PO(t).
The most important step in the simulation process is the determination of
the generators’ price offers, since these values will determine the consumers
preferences. The algorithms based on which the generators determine their
offered prices in each step are in general variable elements of the model.
2.3.2 Simulation and optimization issues
In the proposed framework every coalition C tries to maximize its expected
profit via its own algorithm AC while assuming that the other players of the
Competition and cooperation in a bidding model of electrical energy trade 11
Based on PO(t-1), and AC 
each coalition determines 
pokj for each j in C. PO(t) 
is constructed 
columnwise by the price 
offers of the generators.
Based on PO(t) the 
consumers determine 
their preference orderings 
over the generators and 
report it to the INR.
Based on the consumers’ 
preferences, the INR 
determines the most 
preferred matching.
Is the most 
preferred matching 
stable and feasible?
No
END
(the most preferred 
matching is realized)
nv=nv+1
The INR determines all 
matchings where the 
consumers preferences 
are violated in nv case.
nv=0
Is there a stable 
and 
feasiblematching 
among these?
Yes
Yes
No
From the stable and feasible matchings the 
INR chooses the one, which implies the lowest 
social cost. If multiple stable and feasible 
matchings exist with the same total social cost, 
the one with the highest stability margin is 
realized.
END
Fig. 1 The matching algorithm of the ISO.
game will offer the same prices as in the previous step. Formally this means
that every coalition is trying to solve the optimization problem
max
∑
j∈C
Φjexp(POexp(t)) = F(µ(Pref(POexp(t)))) (1)
where Φjexp(POexp(t)) denotes the expected profit of player j at time t. POexp(t)
denotes the matrix of expected price offers, which, for coalition C, apart from
columns j ∈ C, is equal to PO(t− 1) (since all coalitions expect the outsider
players not to change their price offers). Pref(POexp(t)) denotes the prefer-
ence set up by the consumers according to POexp(t) (every consumer defines
an ordering of the generators according to increasing price offers). µ is defined
by the matching algorithm of the ISO depicted in Fig. 1, and F denotes the
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determination of the resulting profit from the matching as described in Section
2.2. The number of variables to be optimized depends on the coalition size and
the market regulations (see later). If the actual coalitions has k members and
zonal pricing (different price offer for each consumer) is allowed, the number
of variables is k · nc. If no zonal pricing is allowed, this number is simply k.
Taking into account that the objective function is discontinuous (the con-
sumer’s preferences change abruptly as the preference of consumers may change
considering infinitesimally small price changes) and multiple local extrema
may exist (expected profits may be increased either by raising prices, or via
the possible reduction of prices which may lead to multiple consumers, higher
production rate and so higher production efficiency) Therefore the offered price
strongly depends on the capabilities of the algorithm used for the optimization
of the expected profit function (see Appendix B).
This implies, that the proposed model is capable of comparing different
optimization methods for the pricing problem, as in general it can be assumed
that different players use different optimization methods, or they have different
computing capacity.
Appendix B describes the comparison of various optimization methods
for the pricing problem. Based on the results detailed there, and taking into
account the desired feasibility of simulations, in this paper we assume that
each player or coalition uses the particle swarm method for the optimization
of the offered prices with a time limitation of 30s in each step6.
Regarding scalability, the network-flow calculations are feasible even in
the case of about hundred nodes (Fisher et al, 2008). The bottleneck is the
two-stage pricing-optimization problem (1) of the coalitions. To determine its
expected profit, a coalition in the proposed model has to be aware of match-
ing algorithm of the ISO, which includes network-flow calculations and the
minimization of the additional costs for the consumers whose preference is
violated. Regarding zonal pricing, as the number of consumers, and so the
number of price offers increase, the dimension of the search space correspond-
ing to the optimization problem extends, which implies significant increase of
the required computational time. If we constrain the calculation time of the
particle swarm method, in such cases the standard deviation of the simulation
results will be significantly larger. A possible approach may be to truncate the
strategy space of the players: In the current model infinitely many price offers
may be realized, since the strategy space (the offered price) for the players
is continuous. If we allow eg. only 3 prices for each player (a low, a medium,
and a high), and assume only 8 consumers, for 1 generator there are 6000+
possibilities of price offers, in each time step for each generator (and each
evaluation includes network flow calculations). Furthermore in this case we
get a mixed-integer problem. If we assume that one of the cooperating gener-
6 If we compare the difference between a time-constrained and not time constrained sim-
ulation results in the case of the proposed example, we can conclude that the variability is
similar to the case when we compare eg. two time-unconstrained optimization results, due
to the stochastic elements in the optimization process. This means that the 30s constraint
is acceptable in this case.
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ators is using the proposed explicit optimization while the other players use
more simple rule-based methods or less computationally demanding optimiza-
tion methods, the proposed framework may be applied easily with a tractable
computational demand also in the case of larger problems. The basis of coop-
eration is the information in the proposed model - cooperating generators are
aware of each others actual price offers. Such a scenario is however not capable
of validating the hypotheses formulated later for zonal and general pricing in
the case of larger networks, since the strategies of the players in this case are
not symmetric as it will be in the proposed case. Fitting the problem for larger
networks, and finding the optimization framework which can efficiently han-
dle the non-continuous, many variable objective function may be a challenging
task for the future.
Simulations detailed in the following were done using MATLAB. Since the
particle swarm method used in the simulations has stochastic elements, the
outcome of the pricing optimization may change from run to run. Accordingly,
each simulation was done multiple times and a statistical average is presented
and discussed. The simulation time-frame was determined as the shortest hori-
zon in which the model produced significant results (see the discussion later).
Equilibrium and convergence aspects
As it has been mentioned equilibrium analysis is not included among the aims
of this paper. Intuitively we can say that because of the various approaches via
which a coalition may increase its profit (increase of offered prices on the one
hand and decreasing them to divert customers from other generators), even
the existence of the equilibrium for the defined problem is questionable. This
intuition is supported by the fact that the offered prices in the simulations
done never converged to a Nash equilibrium7 or limit cycle regardless of the
simulation length, coalition structure, market regulations and asymmetric-
information assumptions. If the model converged to an equilibrium, or if the
existence of such could be proved, it would be straightforward to define the
coalition payoffs via the equilibrium profits.
Furthermore while in other models (see e.g. (Ruiz et al, 2012)) the nonzero
level of demand elasticity (and e.g. piecewise constant price-demand curves
and market clearing) may promote equilibrium, the assumed zero demand
elasticity in the proposed model implies a different scenario.
3 Results and discussion
To demonstrate the game considered in Section 2.3 and some possibly arising
phenomena we use the example network depicted in Fig. 2. The Yst values
denote the admittance values of the line connecting node s and t. We sup-
pose that the transmission-capacity constraint qst, the maximum amount of
7 A Nash equilibrium in our model would mean a set of price offers that no coalition may
improve its profit by unilaterally changing its price offer(s).
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energy which can be transmitted via the corresponding transmission line, is
proportional to the admittance as qst = 2.4Yst
8.
1
2
7
5
34 6
Y12=1
Y15=1
Y13=1.1
Y26=1
Y27=1
Y36=1.4
Y57=1
Y45=1
Y46=1
(3)
(1)
(1)(4)
(5)
Y35=1.4
(4)(6)
Fig. 2 Topology and parameters of network 1. The Yst values denote the admittance values
of the line connecting node s and t while qst denotes the transmission capacity constraint of
line s-t. The numbers next to the nodes indicate the available generation amounts and re-
quired consumption quantities denoted by inward and outward arrows respectively (denoted
with W in Appendix A.).
3.1 Cooperation may be necessary among generators to divert consumers
from previous providers
In the following, first without the explicit analysis of profits and prices, we’ll
demonstrate how cooperating players may overcome limitations regarding network-
stability during the extension of their client-set while diverting a consumer
from a third generator. The further aim of this example is to demonstrate how
the stability properties of the network may be a barrier for some matchings
between generators and consumers.
Regarding the nodes in Fig. 2, 1, 2, 3 and 4 correspond to generators and 5,
6 and 7 correspond to consumers. At each node the desired consumption and
maximal production values are indicated in parentheses. Nodes with arrows
pointing from these values towards the nodes represent generators, while ar-
rows pointing outward from the node indicate consumers. First let us identify
8 The value of 2.4 has been determined taking into account the following two considera-
tions: First, the network shall be able to have a transmission capacity to fulfill the consumers
needs (lower bound), and second, the transmission capacities have to impose real constraints
on the stable matchings (upper bound).
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the monopolistic coalitions in the case of network 1, since they are not allowed
according to our assumptions. Since e.g. the following matchings
(
5 6 7
2 1 1
) (
5 6 7
1 3 3
) (
5 6 7
3 2 2
) (
5 6 7
3 4 4
)
(
5 6 7
2 4 4
) (
5 6 7
1 4 4
)
are stable and feasible, we may conclude that all 2-player coalitions are non-
monopolistic. If we analyze further matchings, the calculations show that none
of the generators is able to supply the consumers alone in a feasible and stable
way. This implies that every coalition with at least 3 members is monopolistic.
Let us suppose the initial stable and feasible matching depicted in Fig. 3 9
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5
34 6
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1.05 (2.64)
0.85 (2.4)
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0
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.36)
0.29 (3.36)
0.6 (2.4)
0.1
5 
(2.
4)
0.15 (2.4)
Fig. 3 Flows in the case of network 1, and the stable and feasible generator-consumer
matching 5-1, 6-2, 7-3. Matchings are labeled with different colors. The numbers on the
edges in parentheses denote the maximal flow value on the edge.
3.1.1 Coalition structure {1} {2},{3},{4}
Let us consider first the all-singleton partition {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, the initial
stable and feasible matching depicted in Fig. 3 and the possible cooperation of
generators 1 and 2. Let us assume that generator 1 offers a price for consumer
7 which is lower than the price offered by generator 3, its current supplier.
In general, this can be a rational decision for generator 1, as the increase of
9 Results in Figures e.g. in Fig. 3 are only indicated in a 2 digit precision, which (due to
rounding) may seem as inconsistencies: E.g. at node 5 1.55 + 0.15 + 0.71 + 0.6 = 3.01 while
the more accurate values are 1.5497 + 0.1471 + 0.7059 + 0.5973 = 3.
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its load leads to more effective utilization of its capacities and this may imply
even higher profits for him, even in the case of lower prices offered.
However, independent of the exact offered prices and potential profit change,
although the capacity of generator 1 is sufficient to supply both consumers 5
and 7, and no lines would be basically overloaded, this configuration is not
allowed by the ISO, because of stability issues depicted in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4 If generator 1 would supply consumer 5 and 7, the network would lose its stability
(according to def. 2): The failure of line 1-7 would lead to the overload of line 1-5, so this
configuration is not allowed by the ISO. However not included in the figure, further stability
issues arise regarding this configuration: The failure of line 2-6 or 5-7 would also result in
the overload of line 1-5.
As illustrated in Fig. 5 neither is Generator 2 able to supply consumer 7
in addition to its already established client, consumer 6.
3.1.2 Coalition structure {1,2},{3},{4}
However, if Generators 1 and 2 are able to somehow arrange their prices in
order to exchange their former consumers (5 and 6) between themselves, gen-
erator 1 is able to supply consumer 7 in addition to its former client 6 in a
stable and feasible manner, as depicted in Fig 6.
It is important to note that, even in the case of cooperating generators, the
consumers are still assigned to generators, not to coalitions of generators. The
cooperating generators may however design their price offers jointly and thus
influence the preference of consumers in a way to reach a beneficial resulting
configuration.
Competition and cooperation in a bidding model of electrical energy trade 17
1
2
7
5
34 6
3
1
13
2
00
0.15 (2.4)
1.8 (2.4)
1.05 (2.64)
1.35 (2.4)
0.8 (2.4)
0
.21
 (3
.36)
0.21 (3.36)
0.85 (2.4)
0.1
5 
(2.
4)
0.15 (2.4)
1
2
7
5
34 6
3
1
13
2
00
0.52 (2.4)
2.47 (2.4)
1.05 (2.64)
1.48 (2.4)
0
.58
 (3
.36)
0.58 (3.36)
1.52 (2.4)
0.4
1 
(2.
4)
0.41 (2.4)
Fig. 5 If generator 2 would supply consumer 6 and 7, the network would also lose its
stability: The failure of line 2-6 would lead to the overload of line 1-5, so this configuration
is neither allowed by the ISO.
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Fig. 6 Via cooperation, generators 1 and 2 are able to exchange their former consumers
among themselves and divert consumer 7 from generator 3.
3.2 Analysis of market regulations: Zonal versus global price offers
In the following we will analyze the PFF game defined in Section 2.3 over the
given network (network 1) and player set. As mentioned, the value of a certain
coalition embedded in a partition will be defined straightforwardly via the sum
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of its member’s total profits. The total resulting profit of the players is derived
via the evaluation of consecutive simulation steps as detailed in Section 2.3.1.
The first question we aim to analyze with our model is how the possibility
of zonal pricing affects the profits of the generators and the total social cost. If
zonal pricing is allowed each generator may offer its energy to each consumer
on a different price.
3.2.1 All-singleton coalitions, zonal pricing, example
The scenario detailed next will serve as a reference for our future analysis to
show some details of the evolution of profits. In this setup all players form
singleton coalitions Q = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}}. Furthermore, in this reference
case all generators are allowed to offer zone-dependent prices. In other words,
they may offer their generated energy for sale for each individual consumer at
a different price.
We assume the following production characteristic parameters: a1 = 0.65 [$],
a2 = 0.36 [$], a3 = 0.68 [$], a4 = 0.7 [$], m1 = 0.1 [$/MWh], m2 =
0.07 [$/MWh], m3 = 0.08 [$/MWh], m4 = 0.04 [$/MWh]. Furthermore,
let us assume the initial offered zonal prices are described by the following
matrix
PO(0) =


0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.85 0.75 0.95 1.05
0.97 1.07 0.87 0.77


If we assume 10 iteration steps and calculate the price offers and the resulting
matchings, the evolution of generator profits will be as depicted in Fig. 7. The
number of iteration steps was determined to keep the computations feasible.
The optimization takes 30s for each player or coalition and this has to be done
in every partition and every step. As we will see these 10 steps are enough to
show the phenomena we are interested in.
As we can see in Fig. 7 (a) in each step 2 or 3 generators supply the
consumers with energy. At least one generator is lacking consumers in every
step, which implies a profit of 0. According to our simulation results the game
does not tend to converge to a Nash equilibrium even if the number of iterations
is increased by several orders of magnitude.
We can see that generator 4 whose m parameter is the smallest amongst
the 4 (he can increase his efficiency with the produced quantity the least) is
usually able to reach the low profits. Furthermore, we have to note that in
general profits may be also negative. This can be explained on the one hand
by the assumption that if a generator offers a given price for a current time-
step, in our model it has to fulfill all consumer demands towards him in that
step, and on the other hand price offers of generators are based on the prices
of competitors in the previous step (in other words, generators are rational in
according to the information available about their competitors in the previous
step and information about their coalitional partners at the actual step). If a
generator was able to back off, the ISO would have to recalculate the matching
in each such case. It is possible that a generator expects that it may supply
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Fig. 7 (a) Evolution of generator profits in the reference case. Players do not cooperate,
have no information about each other’s production characteristic and are allowed to offer
zonal prices for consumers. (b) The evolution of total social cost during the simulation.
multiple consumers and so utilize the more efficient part of its production
characteristics, but the real scenario results only in a single customer for it. In
this case, on the offered price, the income may not be even enough to cover the
cost of energy production - this, as we see, is however not a typical scenario.
The evolution of the total social cost SCT during the 10 simulation steps
is depicted in Fig. 7 (b).
3.2.2 Zonal pricing
If zonal pricing is allowed, the resulting partition function, single profits, and
total social costs will be as summarized in Table 1.
Before the comparison of these results with the ones without zonal pricing
available let us make a few observations. First, it can be observed that the
results reflect the production characteristics. Generator 2, which has the most
efficient production curve, reaches the highest profit in most of the cases,
unlike generator 4, whose profit is usually among the lowest ones. Second,
let us note that cooperation is almost always beneficial for the players. We
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Partition Values Φ1 Φ2 Φ3 Φ4 SCT
1,2,3,4 3.77, 5.23, 2.08, 2.39 3.77 5.23 2.08 2.39 37.21
{1,2},3,4 9.23, 4.34, 2.45 1.78 7.45 4.34 2.45 39.32
{1,3},2,4 6.51, 5.26, 1.16 4.56 5.26 1.95 1.16 36.07
{1,4},2,3 5.76, 5.83, 2.88 3.92 5.83 2.88 1.84 41.65
1,{2,3},4 7.69, 14.99, 1.91 7.69 13.56 1.43 1.91 40.27
1,{2,4},3 3.84 , 10.96, 2.8 3.84 10.32 2.8 0.64 40.94
1,2,{3,4} 2.33, 7.84, 8.04 2.33 7.84 5.88 2.16 41.44
{1,2},{3,4} 9.75, 8.38 3.11 6.64 5.42 2.96 43.84
{1,3},{2,4} 6.97, 7.38 3.20 6.81 3.77 0.57 38.13
{1,4},{2,3} 9.76, 8.71 5.92 5.83 2.88 3.84 41.65
Table 1 Simulation results corresponding to zonal pricing. Bold typeface represents sub-
additive merging (when the resulting profit of a coalition is less than the sum of individual
profits of its members - in other words strictly not superadditive). The results are the av-
erage of 10 simulations. The average standard deviation-values of the players profits were
[0.47 0.75 0.41 0.38] respectively, while the average standard deviation of SCT was 1.01.
use the game-theoretic concept of superadditivity for the analysis whether a
cooperation is beneficial for its members or not. Formally if Q and R are
partitions and (∀Q ∈ Q)(∃R ∈ R)(Q ⊆ R), we say that Q is a refinement
of R. In this case, under superadditivity we mean that for the values of the
coalitions (embedded in the corresponding partitions) the following inequality
holds: v(Q1,Q) + ... + v(Qk,Q) ≤ v(R,R) where R =
⋃k
i=1Qk. For example
if we consider the emerging cooperation between player 1 and 2, we have to
analyze the superadditivity in two cases. First if players 3 and 4 are acting
independently: in this case the total payoff of players 1 and 2 increases from
9 to 9.23, and second if players 3 and 4 are forming a coalition, the payoff of
players 1 and 2 practically decreases (10.17 vs. 9.75).
We can observe that cooperation is usually beneficial for the generators,
this is not always the case: The network topology, production characteristics,
and behavior of other players determine if players may increase their total
payoff via cooperation or not10.
Furthermore, we may point out how important the assumption of trans-
ferable utility is. Although in general cooperation implies higher individual
profits as well, this is not necessary. In the case eg. of the cooperation of play-
ers 2 and 4, players 1 and 3 may raise their resulting profit with cooperation
from 6.64 to 6.97 but regarding the single generators while generator 3 ben-
efits from the cooperation, generator 1 has to face a lower individual profit.
In this case if generator 3 can not entirely transfer a part of its profit for
the payoff to generator 1 entirely free, the cooperation may be reconsidered.
Regarding externalities it can be easily seen (eg. the formation of {1, 3} from
singletons) that coalition formation may imply both negative and positive ex-
ternalities on the remaining players. In addition, we may compare the average
total social cost in the cases where no multi-generator companies appear on
the market (37.21), if one multi-generator company appears (39.95), and if 2
10 Of course cooperation implies that cooperating generators increase (or at least not
decrease) their expected profit. However the realized profit may be significantly different.
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multi-generator companies appear (41.21). We can see that as expected, the
presence of larger firms dampens the competition and results in higher prices
for the consumers.
3.2.3 General pricing
If no zonal pricing is allowed, every generator offers its energy to every con-
sumer at the same price. In this case, the initial conditions are taken as
POinit =


0.85 0.8 0.9 1
0.85 0.8 0.9 1
0.85 0.8 0.9 1


In this case Table 2 summarizes the results.
Partition Values Φ1 Φ2 Φ3 Φ4 SCT
1,2,3,4 3.31, 4.41, 0.04, 0.4 3.31 4.41 0.04 0.4 29.4
{1,2},3,4 8.54, 0.76, 0.29 3.7 4.84 0.76 0.29 30.7
{1,3},2,4 5.87, 6.97, 2.75 3.11 6.97 2.75 0.79 35.78
{1,4},2,3 7.32, 8.11, 0.77 6.25 8.11 0.77 1.07 37.52
1,{2,3},4 5.27, 8.12, 2.28 5.27 6.64 1.48 2.28 37.31
1,{2,4},3 3.44, 5.25, 0.52 3.44 5.25 0.52 0 30.08
1,2,{3,4} 2.74, 3.28, 1.26 2.74 3.28 0.93 0.33 28.75
{1,2},{3,4} 10.53, 7.32 0.84 9.69 4.9 2.42 43.76
{1,3},{2,4} 11.84, 9.36 5.67 6.9 6.17 2.46 46.3
{1,4},{2,3} 12.47, 16.07 6.24 12.2 1.80 2.89 47.53
Table 2 Simulation results corresponding to general pricing. Bold typeface represents sub-
additive merging. The results are the average of 10 simulations. The average standard devi-
ation values of the players profits were [0.54 0.88 0.5 0.28] respectively, while the average
standard deviation of SCT was 1.36.
Regarding superadditivity, in this case all of the coalitions meet the re-
quirement.
The most important issue regarding the total social cost is that while the
average prices in the case of none or one multi-generator company appears
on the market (29.4 and 33.36 = (30.7 + 35.78 + 37.52 + 37.31 + 30.08 +
28.75)/6) respectively) is significantly lower than in the case of zonal pricing,
the competition of two multi-generator companies result in very high average
social cost (45.86) in the case of general pricing. We may state that our model
simulations suggest the following: In the case of a highly competitive market,
general pricing is beneficial for the consumers, while in the case of a market
dominated by few multi-generator companies, zonal pricing may decrease the
total social cost.
However we have to note that this hypothesis, yet plausible, is supported
only by the proposed case study. The generalization of these results to larger
networks requires more research on the subject.
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3.3 Asymmetric information
As we have seen in the examples before, generator 4, thanks to its disadvan-
tageous production characteristics, was almost always able to reach only the
lowest profits. In the following we will examine how much does it help if a gen-
erator is aware some of the other players offers. We suppose full competition
(all-singleton coalitions) in this case.
In addition to the symmetric-information case, we will analyze 3 scenarios.
Player 4 may be aware of one, two or all three price offers. If eg. player 4
has information of one other player’s price offer, this player can be player 1,2,
or 3. Table 3 summarizes the average profits of the players and the average
resulting total social cost in various cases of additional information of player
4.
Information Φ1 Φ2 Φ3 Φ4 SCT
Symmetric 3.77 5.23 2.08 2.39 37.21
One additional offer 3.79 8.84 4.37 2.63 43.26
Two additional offers 4.22 7.39 2.41 2.92 40.02
Three additional offers 2.98 7.2 3.71 3.42 47.29
Table 3 Simulation results: Zonal Pricing, asymmetric information, full competition - ad-
ditional information of player 4. The results are the average of 10 simulations. The average
standard-deviation values of the players profits were [0.34 0.81 0.44 0.28] respectively,
while the average standard deviation of SCT was 1.29.
We can see that although the additional information of one or two price
offers increases the profit of player 4, the real advantage is the case when it is
aware of all other offers.
Information Φ1 Φ2 Φ3 Φ4 SCT
Symmetric 3.31 4.41 0.04 0.4 29.4
One additional offer 3.86 4.53 1.36 0.54 32.06
Two additional offers 3.91 3.75 1.14 0.27 31.37
Three additional offers 4.21 5.53 0.24 0.46 31.69
Table 4 Simulation results: General Pricing, asymmetric information, full competition -
additional information of player 4. The results are the average of 10 simulations. The average
standard deviation values of the players profits were [0.5 0.74 0.24 0.33] respectively, while
the average standard deviation of SCT was 1.12.
Table 4 shows that under general pricing player 4 can not take significant
advantage of the additional information as in the case of zonal pricing. The
disadvantageous production characteristics and the low degree of freedom im-
plied by the uniform prices can not be balanced by such additional information
in this scenario.
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4 Conclusions
In this article a model framework is proposed, which is able to analyze the effect
of cooperation, asymmetric information and market regulations on the profit
of generator companies and on the cost of price preference consumers. In the
demonstrated cases all players/coalitions were about to maximize their profit
with numerical optimization based on the available information, however more
simple strategies (eg. leader-follower) can also be assumed, which do not need
this amount of computational effort. The particle-swarm optimization method
applied during the simulations includes stochastic elements, which implies that
the determined optimum may be not the same considering repetitive runs.
Regarding the main conclusions of the simulations the variability of the results
is acceptable, however according to this issue one primary further aim is to
develop a more trusty and computationally efficient optimization algorithm
for the pricing problem.
Furthermore, we have to note that even considering cooperation, the model
assumes an essential competitive element in the market. The exclusion of mo-
nopolistic coalitions ensures that each consumer will have at least two alter-
natives for bargaining, regarding coalitions.
As the structure of power transmission networks may be subject to changes
due to various reasons (eg. maintenance, installation of new lines), simula-
tion studies similar to the proposed examples may help to determine how
the changes in the network parameters affect the market power of exist-
ing/potential coalitions.
It is important to emphasize that the proposed model is far from being
strictly realistic considering both the physical and the economic part. The
transmission losses, which are currently not included in the model, would im-
ply an excess in the total injected energy. Furthermore they would penalize
generator-consumer pairs, which are far from each other and thus such match-
ings may result in completely different network-flow configurations and profits.
In addition in the case of real scenarios, energy suppliers dominantly use
various generating units with diverse production characteristics to meet their
consumers needs. While in the case of generating units with great inertia the
rescheduling itself may imply significant costs, units of other types (eg. gas
turbines) may be set up easily but can not be shut down and restarted eco-
nomically. Of course one can not avoid the problem of renewable sources,
which dominantly operate at very low production costs. They are subject to
weather conditions and thus bring uncertainty to the system. One straightfor-
ward future direction for the development of the current model is to include
these more complex production characteristics and probability-type variables
in the system. We have to note that cooperative game theory already offers
tools (Habis and Herings, 2011) to manage uncertainties. This approach has
been used in the case of externalities and power transmission networks as well
(Habis and Csercsik, 2014).
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Furthermore, our model also does not handle voltage-stability issues, which
could be an additional factor to take into account while determining stable
matchings of the network (Van Cutsem and Vournas, 1998).
As our model uses an iterative approach, one straightforward generalization
assumption may be that the consumption needs are changing over time. This
may affect the resulting profits multiple ways (smaller consumption amounts
may be supplied by multiple providers, while maybe the competition boil down
to the competition of two coalitions if the needed amount becomes greater).
Regarding economic aspects, also multiple future development directions
can be considered. First of all, the model completely neglects the fee which is
paid for the usage of the transmission network. The determination of trans-
mission prices has been a subject of several studies (see eg. (Christie et al,
2000; Kirschen et al, 1997; Wijayatunga, 2003)). The proposed model can be
quite easily extended to include transmission prices, and the effect of vari-
ous transmission pricing strategies can be analyzed in the case of different
scenarios.
At second, if we consider realistic energy providers, we have to assume that
one company may hold multiple generation units, and the transaction takes
place not between a consumer and a generator, but between the consumer
and the power company. In this case the problem will be more complex. Since
we may assume that the company tries to optimize its production cost, and
that the quantity which has to be fed into the network by the company to
meet its consumers needs may be generated at different nodes - it is likely
that the generation configuration optimal for the company will not match the
generation configuration optimal for network stability. In this case the power
companies may be considered as players of the game.
We hope that the future extensions of the proposed model will be available
to study the above problems also in the case of models of real power networks.
A Appendix: DC Load flow models: a short summary
In this appendix we introduce DC load flow models and point out some important properties
of them. The notations and the mathematical formalism are based on Wu et al (1996) and
Contreras (1997).
We consider a network with n nodes (generators or consumers) and m edges (trans-
mission lines) among them. The network is given by the node-branch incidence matrix
A ∈ Rn×m. We characterise generators and consumers by the quantity of actual W ∈ Rn
+
and maximal W¯ ∈ Rn+ generated or, respectively, consumed power and transmission lines
by the admittance matrix Y (equivalently by the susceptance matrix B) and transmis-
sion capacity vector Q¯ ∈ Rm+ . The power network can therefore be summarised as 5-tuple
(N,A, W¯ , Y, Q¯).
The basic equations of the model are as follows.
The relation between the total inlet/outlet power and power flows (or nodal balances)
can be described by
AQ =W, (2)
where Q ∈ Rm denotes the power flow vector, and W ∈ Rn is the power injection vector.
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On the other hand, if we assume that the nodes i and j are connected by a transmission
line with admittance Yij = Yji, we have
BΘ = W (3)
where W is the vector of the generated/consumed power at the nodes, B ∈ Rn×n denotes
the susceptance matrix whose elements are Bkl = −Ykl for the off-diagonal terms and
Bkk = −
∑
l 6=k
Bkl
(the column sum of off-diagonals) for diagonal elements and Θ ∈ Rn is vector of nodal
voltage angles (θi)
11. θ can be calculated as θ = B+W , where B+ is the Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse of B.
The admittance values determine the power flows via the voltage angles as
qij = Yij sin(θi − θj) (4)
Assuming that (θi − θj) is small, sin(x) may be approximated with x. The flows can be
determined as
Q = BDATΘ (5)
where BD is a diagonal matrix with BD
kk
= Yij .
This leads to the so called DC load flow model, in which the equations describing the
power flow will me mathematically equivalent with the Kirchoff-equations describing cur-
rent flow in DC voltage networks of resistors. DC load flow models exhibit the following
uniqueness property.
Given power injections and power consumptions W at each node, the phase angles θi
are determined by solving a system of linear equations. From the phase angle differences,
the line flows can be uniquely determined.
To point out some properties of the model let us consider the example with 3 nodes (2
generators, nodes 1 and 3 and 1 consumer, node 2) and 3 transmission lines. On Figure 8(a)
we can see the ideal production/consumtion levels as well as the impedance and capacity
levels. qij shows the actual flows. In this example the optimal flow is not constrained by
transmission capacities. We may calculate the voltage angles as θ = B+W = [−2.42 2.74 −
0.32] from which the flows can be calculated via equation 5.
If we double the admittance and maximal transmission capacity between the nodes
2 and 3 (which can be regarded as the physical duplication of the power line, shown on
Figure 8(b)), the line 1-3 will be overloaded, since the increased overall admittance of line 1-
3-2 ”draws the flow” onto that branch from 1-2. Of course a suitable reduction of production
and consumption levels (moving away from the ideal values) leads to a feasible flow, not
violating the line transmission constraints. If we reduce the power injections, the flows are
reduced under the transmission capacities as in Fig. 8(c).
The constraint describing the maximum line power flows can be formulated as
|Q| = |BDATΘ| = |BDATB+W | < Q¯ (6)
where |Q¯| is branch power flow limit vector (composed of the elements q¯ij), and BD ∈ Rm×m
is a diagonal matrix with BD
kk
= Yij . W is the variable power injection while BD , B+, AT
and Q¯ are derived from the parameters of the network as detailed above.
A.1 n− 1 line contingency
n− 1 line contingency means that the lines must not be overloaded in the case of a sudden
line failure. A sudden failure means that the operators do not have time to reschedule the
11 In AC systems voltage is represented as a vector rotating on the complex plane. The
angular speed of these vectors at the nodes is the same, but the actual angles may differ
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Fig. 8 Power flow on a simple 3-node network. The arrows pointing in and out of the nodes
denote the power injections consumptions (W ). If we double the connection between 2 and
3, line 1-3 gets overloaded. qij denotes the actual power flow on edge i, j while q¯ij denotes
the maximum transmission capacity. Θ1 = [-2.42 2.74 -0.32]T , Θ2= [ -2.60 2.21 0.38]T
and Θ3 = [ -2.22 1.94 0.28]T
generators (change the power inlets to the network). If a line fails, the matrices A and B
change (originally nonzero elements become zero). If we denote the new matrices with Aˆ and
Bˆ, n − 1 line contingency means that in addition to constraint (6), the following equation
has to hold as well for all matrices implied by the possible single line failures.
|Q| = |BˆDAˆTΘ| = |BˆDAˆT Bˆ+W | < Q¯ (7)
Power injection vectors (W ) which result in the fulfillment of this property, are n − 1
line contingency-safe. In this paper we call these configurations simply stable.
B Appendix: Comparison of optimization methods for the pricing
problem
The most critical element of the proposed model is the determination of price offers. Since the
expected profit-optimization problem (see. Eq. 1) is not trivial because of the discontinuities
of the objective function and multiple local extrema. Furthermore one or more from these
local extrema usually lie in the neighborhood of the discontinuities. The reason for this is
that a generator g may increase its expected profit with the increase of the price offered to
one customer, until the offered price becomes equal or greater compared to the price offered
by one of its competitors, in which case (if the corresponding matching is stable and feasible)
the consumer will be diverted from the generator g, and the expected profit corresponding to
this transaction falls to 0. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, with the lowering of its
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offered prices generator g may divert customers of competitors and enhance the efficiency of
its production. The existence of local multiple extrema calls for global optimization methods,
however we include a local approach as well for reference.
In this appendix we compare several optimization methods for this pricing problem. The
algorithms analyzed are the following.
– Simulated annealing (van Laarhoven and Aarts, 2008) (SA), as implemented in the
MATLAB function simulannealbnd.
– NOMAD Nonlinear optimization with the MADS algorithm (Le Digabel, 2011).
– Particle swarm (PS) pattern search method (Vaz and Vicente, 2007).
– NLOPT (Johnson, 2010) (with the solver GN DIRECT).
– IPOPT Interior Point Optimizer (Wa¨chter and Biegler, 2006) (local optimization).
The later 4 functions were obtained by the OPTI toolbox (Currie and Wilson, 2012).
The comparison was performed as follows. All of the above methods were used to solve
the pricing optimization problem in a simulation of 25 steps with 4 players. In each step for
each player, each method was used to perform the optimization and the resulting values of
the objective function were compared (since computationally minimization is performed but
the objective is to maximize the expected profit, the −Φjexp was used). Considering that the
price optimization process during the simulations has to be carried out in each time step for
each coalition, the maximal computation time of each algorithm was limited to 30s. In each
case the results of different methods were compared to the minimum value obtained by the
actually most effective algorithm. The results are depicted in Fig. 9.
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Fig. 9 Performance of the various optimization approaches in the case of the pricing prob-
lem.
At first glance it can be seen in Fig. 9 that, as expected, the local method IPOPT is less
effective in most of the cases compared to the global approaches. We may use the integral
of the curves depicted in Fig. 9 to quantitatively characterize the efficiency of the methods.
We denote the accumulated difference compared to the best solution with FA.
Method SA NOMAD PS NLOPT IPOPT
FA 16.74 21.32 1.30 20.32 66.13
Table 5 Accumulated performance of optimization approaches in the case of the pricing
problem.
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The results in table 5 show that in most of the cases the PS method provides the best
values, and it shows the best performance among the analyzed methods.
Considering the 30s computation time limitation of the optimization, a further prelimi-
nary experiment was performed to estimate the convergence properties of the PS algorithm.
A simulation of 10 steps and 4 players was performed. After every optimization procedure
performed by the PS, the resulting values were used as initial condition for the local op-
timization method fminsearch, which uses the gradient-free Nelder-Mead simplex method
(Olsson and Nelson, 1975) to validate the local minimality of the solution points. Analyzing
these 40 realistic cases, the result was that the simplex method with maximum 250 itera-
tions (meaning about one minute additional computational time in each case) was not able
to enhance the value of the objective function significantly (by more than 0.01%) in half
of the cases. Moreover, the increase was below 5% in 85% of the cases, with the greatest
improvement brought by the simplex being about 15% (in one case). Based on these pre-
liminary simulations it can be concluded that the PS with the above time limitation means
an acceptable trade-off for the pricing optimization problem.
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